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ABSTRACT
Homomorphic encryption is a tool that enables compu-
tation on encrypted data and thus has applications in
privacy-preserving cloud computing. Though conceptu-
ally amazing, implementation of homomorphic encryp-
tion is very challenging and typically software imple-
mentations on general purpose computers are extremely
slow. In this paper we present our domain specific ar-
chitecture in a heterogeneous Arm+FPGA platform to
accelerate homomorphic computing on encrypted data.
We design a custom co-processor for the computationally
expensive operations of the well-known Fan-Vercauteren
(FV) homomorphic encryption scheme on the FPGA,
and make the Arm processor a server for executing dif-
ferent homomorphic applications in the cloud, using
this FPGA-based co-processor. We use the most re-
cent arithmetic and algorithmic optimization techniques
and perform design-space exploration on different lev-
els of the implementation hierarchy. In particular we
apply circuit-level and block-level pipeline strategies to
boost the clock frequency and increase the throughput
respectively. To reduce computation latency, we use
parallel processing at all levels. Starting from the highly
optimized building blocks, we gradually build our multi-
core multi-processor architecture for computing. We
implemented and tested our optimized domain specific
programmable architecture on Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+
MPSoC ZCU102 Evaluation Kit. At 200 MHz FPGA-
clock, our implementation achieves over 13x speedup
with respect to a highly optimized software implementa-
tion of the FV homomorphic encryption scheme on an
Intel i5 processor running at 1.8 GHz.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud services play an important role in our everyday
life. When we update our Facebook status, check bank
balance or upload photos on Instagram, we use cloud
computers. In business applications, cloud services can
be used for storing and processing information, ana-
lyzing big-data, providing an environment for test and
development, supporting cost-effective disaster recovery,
backing up files and so on [1]. However, cloud computing
raises privacy issues. To compute on the data using
cloud services, we need to deliver our data unencrypted.
Since a cloud computer is a third-party resource, the
owner of the cloud can see, use or abuse the unencrypted
data. For instance, our internet search engine shows
advertisements for cheap hotels or car rental just after
searching for a flight. A cloud service provider may
analyze business data of its clients for its own gain! Ho-
momorphic Encryption (HE) is a tool to prevent invasion
of users’ privacy while keeping the conveniences offered
by the cloud services. HE enables computation on en-
crypted data: users can upload their encrypted data to
the cloud, and yet perform computations while it is kept
encrypted (hidden from cloud owner). Some of the many
interesting HE applications are: privacy-preserving ser-
vices for information storage and processing in business
and health-care applications [2], encrypted web-search
engine [3], electronic voting, and privacy-preserving
prediction from consumption data in smart electricity
meters [4], machine learning on encrypted data [5] etc.
State of the art: Though, HE was conceptualized
by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [6] almost 40 years
ago in 1977, the construction of a HE scheme that can
compute ‘complex’ operations on encrypted data was an
open problem until 2009 when Gentry came up with the
first construction of such a scheme [7]. The first genera-
tion of HE schemes including Gentry’s were extremely
slow, hence did not provide a practical solution. Current
generation HE schemes [8, 9] increased the performance
by orders of magnitude; however, their software imple-
mentations are still very slow. Recent implementation
in a high-end GPU [10] reduce the computation time
by several factors. Hardware accelerators offer parallel
processing capabilities to achieve fast computation time.
In the literature there are several reported hardware
implementation that try to speedup performance of
HE schemes [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
Several of these reported implementations report only
simulation based results. An actual hardware implemen-
tation requires additional building blocks to perform
memory management, synchronization of parallel cores,
and reliable interfacing with a host processor, etc. This
makes implementation of complex HE schemes in hard-
ware very challenging.
Our contributions:
During the Turing 2018 Award Ceremony, Hennessy
and Patterson pointed out that domain-specific archi-
tectures are going to be the computer architectures of
the future as the performances of general-purpose com-
puters are touching their limits. As HE is so complex,
such general-purpose devices fail to satisfy a practical
application. Therefore, we propose a domain-specific ar-
chitecture for HE, implemented on an Arm+FPGA het-
erogeneous platform, that could accelerate homomorphic
computations on encrypted data in cloud installations.
The hardware is used to accelerate the Fan-Vercauteren
(FV) scheme which is a popular HE scheme and has been
implemented in several software libraries, e.g. FV-NFLlib
from CryptoExperts [22] and SEAL from Microsoft [23].
Its hardware implementation poses unique challenges as
it depends on dozens of modules in the design-hierarchy
and their careful integration. We achieved high perfor-
mance with parallel processing minimizing the number of
cycles, and boosted the clock frequency with a pipeline
datapath. In addition, multiple processors are instanti-
ated at the higher level to distribute the computation.
We study the mathematical steps used in the sub-
routines, analyze data dependencies and apply circuit-
level pipeline strategy when constructing the building
blocks for the complex sub-routines. At the higher
level where the building blocks are connected, we ap-
ply a block-level pipeline strategy and optimized task-
scheduling to increase the throughput. To reduce the
number of cycles, we instantiate multiple processing el-
ements inside the building blocks after taking care of
the data dependencies. Starting from these fast building
blocks, we gradually construct our multi-core proces-
sor architecture and implement it in FPGA to compute
homomorphic operations on encrypted data.
We designed the hardware and its software counterpart
in a Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU102 Evalu-
ation Kit [24] and verified its correctness. With these
optimization, our domain specific hardware architecture
achieves 400 homomorphic multiplications per second
at 200 MHz FPGA-clock, including hardware-software
communication overhead. This is over 13x faster than a
FV-NFLlib based highly optimized software running on
an Intel i5 processor at 1.8 GHz clock frequency.
Last but not least, we share our work open source:
https://github.com/KULeuven-COSIC/HEAT
The organization of this paper is as follows: A mathemat-
ical background on homomorphic encryption is provided
in Sec. 2. The parameters of the systemare presented in
Sec. 3. Sec. 4 discusses the design decisions, approaches
and algorithms used. Architecture details are provided
in Sec. 5 and the implementation results shown in Sec. 6.
The final section draws the conclusions.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Homomorphic encryption
A homomorphic encryption scheme is an augmented
encryption scheme with two additional routines HE.Add()
and HE.Mult() to perform add or multiply on encrypted
data. Due to its mathematical homomorphism, the result
is still an encrypted data (called ciphertext) encrypting
the sum or respectively the product of the plaintexts.
Users can upload their ciphertext in an untrusted cloud
and still perform computations on their ciphertext with-
out the need for decryption.
Existing HE schemes are ‘noisy’ in nature. Noise is
used to hide the message during encryption. With every
homomorphic evaluation on the ciphertext, the noise
in the result-ciphertext increases. There is also a noise
threshold beyond which further homomorphic evalua-
tions would result in decryption failures. This threshold
value is called the ‘depth’ of the homomorphic scheme
and it is determined by the choice of parameter set (e.g,
length of data structures and size of coefficients etc.). In
a simplistic view, ‘depth’ of a homomorphic encryption
scheme is analogous to ‘critical path’ of a circuit. An HE
scheme that supports a limited number of evaluations on
ciphertext is called ‘Somewhat Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (SHE).’ When an HE supports unlimited number of
evaluations on ciphertext, it is called ‘Fully Homomor-
phic Encryption (FHE)’ scheme. Existing constructions
of FHE schemes start from a SHE scheme and use a
complicated mechanism known as ‘bootstrapping’ on top
to reduce the noise in the result. Though conceptually
amazing, this bootstrapping mechanism requires a very
large parameter set which adds a drastic performance
penalty. In most real-life applications, the complexity
(i.e., the depth) is bounded and hence application of
SHE instead of FHE makes more sense. In the following
sub-section, we briefly describe the well-known FV [9]
SHE scheme for which we have constructed our domain-
specific high-performance computer architecture.
2.2 FV SHE scheme
The FV SHE scheme was introduced by Fan and
Vercauteren [9] in 2012. Like all other SHE schemes, FV
performs ‘complicated’ mathematical operations. In this
paper, we only provide a high-level description of the
scheme, while details can be found in the original FV
paper [9]. The FV scheme augments a Ring Learning
With Errors (ring-LWE) public-key encryption scheme
with two additional functions Add and Mult to perform
addition and multiplication respectively on ciphertext.
The encryption and decryption operations are described
using a block diagram in Fig. 1.
All computations are performed in a polynomial ring
R = Z[x]/〈f(x)〉 with reduction polynomial f(x) =
Φd(x), the d-th cyclotomic polynomial of degree n =
ϕ(d). The ring is denoted as Rq when the coefficients of
the polynomials reduced to modulo q which is an integer.
All variables shown in Fig. 1 are degree n− 1 polynomi-
als. The public key is the pair (a, b) and the private is
s. During encryption, the message m is encoded, three
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Figure 1: FV encryption and decryption.
polynomials (u, e1, e2) are sampled from an error distri-
bution (typically a discrete Gaussian distribution) and
then polynomial additions and multiplications are per-
formed to generate the ciphertext c which consists of two
polynomials (c0, c1) ∈ (Rq, Rq) with coefficients modulo
q. In practice, the coefficients of u are uniformly ran-
dom signed binary numbers. The decryption performs a
polynomial multiplication followed by an addition and
finally decoding. The security of the encryption scheme
relies on the ring-LWE problem which states that, given
many tuples (ai, bi) ∈ (Rq, Rq), where bi = ai · s+ ei, ai
is uniformly random, and s and ei are unknown poly-
nomials sampled from a proper error distribution, it is
computationally unfeasible to compute the secret s.
Now we describe the Add and Mult functions that
enable computation on ciphertext. Note that these are
the two functions that are executed in the cloud and our
hardware accelerator targets them. Let us consider two
ciphertexts c0 = (c0,0, c0,1) and c1 = (c1,0, c1,1). FV.Add
simply adds the polynomials of the two input ciphertexts
and outputs the result ciphertext c = (c0,0 + c1,0, c0,1 +
c1,1). FV.Mult is the most complicated operation and
it determines the noise growth in the ciphertext. The
steps are shown using a block diagram in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: FV homomorphic multiplication.
The FV.Mult uses additional routines, namely Liftq→Q,
ScaleQ→q, WordDecomp and Relin, besides polynomial
addition and multiplication. Liftq→Q is used to lift the
polynomials to RQ from Rq where Q is a much larger
modulus than q and is in the order of O(n·q2). ScaleQ→q
works in the reverse way, i.e., it scales polynomials from
RQ to Rq. WordDecomp is used to decompose a polyno-
mial, say a ∈ Rq, in base w by slicing each coefficient of a.
It returns a vector of polynomials (as shown using ‘bold’
font in Fig. 2). A toy example of WordDecomp follows. If
the polynomial a(x) = 43+39x+· · · with 6-bit coefficient
size is decomposed in base w = 24, then it outputs a vec-
tor consisting of two polynomials a0(x) = −5 + 7x+ · · ·
and a1(x) = 3+2x+ · · · , where a(x) = a0(x)+24 ·a1(x).
Hence WordDecomp is a cheap operation as it requires
only bit-level manipulation. Relin takes the vector of
polynomials generated by WordDecomp as input and
uses a special ‘relinearization’ key rlk = (rlk0, rlk1)
which is a fixed vector of polynomials, and computes a
relinearised ciphertext c = {c0, c1} ∈ {Rq, Rq}, where
c0 = c˜0+SoP(c˜2, rlk0) and c1 = c˜1+SoP(c˜2, rlk1). Here
SoP stands for summation of products.
3. SYSTEM SETUP
3.1 Parameter set
The multiplicative depth, i.e., the maximum number
of homomorphic multiplications in the critical path that
can be performed before the noise crosses the thresh-
old value, is determined by the parameter set of the
implementation. Larger parameter set implies greater
multiplicative depth. In this paper we design our domain
specific processor architecture to support applications
with small multiplicative depth, say up to 4. This mul-
tiplicative depth is enough to support several statistical
applications such as privacy-friendly forecasting for the
smart grid [4], evaluation of low-complexity block cipher
such as Rasta [25] on ciphertext, private information
retrieval or encrypted search in a table of 216 entries,
encrypted sorting etc. To achieve a multiplicative depth
of four and at least 80-bit security [26], we set the size
of modulus q to 180-bit, the length of polynomials to
4096 coefficients, the standard deviation of the error
distribution to 102 and the width of the larger modulus
Q to at least 372-bit.
3.2 Residue number system
Designing a high-performance domain specific proces-
sor architecture that supports polynomial arithmetic
having 4096 coefficients, each of size 180 or 372-bit is
indeed very challenging. The best performance can be
achieved in hardware if we could leverage the hardware’s
inherent parallelism. Among different levels of abstrac-
tions, parallelism at the algorithm-level leads to the best
performance and eases the implementation of a parallel
architecture. A Residue Number System (RNS) offers
algorithm-level parallelism in long modular arithmetic.
Let the modulus q a product of coprimes q =
∏
qi. RNS
represents a large integer modulo q using a set of smaller
integers modulo qi. Arithmetic on the large integer gets
mapped into multiple smaller arithmetic operations mod-
ulo qi which can be computed in parallel. RNS relies on
the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) which follows.
Theorem 1. Given pairwise coprime positive inte-
gers qi and arbitrary integers ai, the system of simulta-
neous congruences {x ≡ ai mod qi} has a solution, and
the solution is unique modulo q =
∏
qi.
The general way to construct the solution is to com-
pute x ≡ ∑ ai · q˜i · q∗i mod q, where q∗i = qqi and
q˜i = (q
∗
i )
−1 mod qi are constants. On the other hand,
given an integer a mod q, we can get a representation
in RNS just by computing the residues a mod qi. We
use 30-bit primes to construct the RNS for our imple-
mentation. The modulus q is taken as a product of six
30-bit primes, thus q is 180-bit. The larger modulus Q
is taken as a product of q and additional seven 30-bit
primes and thus Q is a 390-bit integer. Let p = Q/q
is the product of the last seven primes. A polynomial
in Rq (or RQ) is represented using six (or 13) residue
polynomials in Rqi . In the FV scheme, polynomial arith-
metic operations such as additions or multiplications
can be performed efficiently by processing the residue
polynomials in parallel.
Though the application of RNS speeds up compu-
tation, it has a major bottleneck. In the FV scheme,
Liftq→Q and ScaleQ→q operations require switching from
one RNS to another as the coefficients are moved from
modulo q to modulo Q or vice versa. This requires
‘merging’ of the parallel residue polynomials using the
general method described for Theorem 1.
4. APPROACH AND ALGORITHMS
The unique challenges that we faced while construct-
ing the high-performance architecture and the design
decisions that we took to address them are described
here. As described in Sec. 2, an application computes
on encrypted data using homomorphic addition (Add)
and multiplication (Mult) operations. Implementation
of Add is easy as it requires only coefficient-wise addi-
tion of the ciphertexts. The actual challenge lies in the
implementation of Mult which performs a set of costly
modular arithmetic operations as shown in Fig. 2.
4.1 HW/SW codesign and task partition.
To design our domain specific architecture, we follow
a hardware-software (HW/SW) codesign approach since
it offers the flexibility of software and the efficiency of
hardware. As the target platform, we chose the het-
erogeneous Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU102
Evaluation Kit which has an FPGA coupled with Arm
processors. HW/SW partitioning is performed after
analyzing the requirement of flexibility, cost of compu-
tation and overhead of communication. We introduced
domain-specific programmability in the FPGA to accel-
erate costly polynomial operations. This gives flexibility
to the Arm processor to support various cloud comput-
ing applications. In [4] it was shown that the maximum
time is spent on computing Mult in the privacy-friendly
prediction application for smart grids. Hence, we fo-
cused on accelerating the Mult using the FPGA. Add
can be implemented in either software or hardware since
it is both a basic and fixed operation. We actually im-
plement the Add in hardware as we found the software
to be slow by an order of magnitude.
4.2 Polynomial multiplication.
In our parameter set, the polynomials consist of 4096
coefficients. For such large polynomials, computation
time is significantly determined by the complexity of
the polynomial multiplication algorithm. A survey of
fast polynomial multiplication algorithms can be found
Algorithm 1 Iterative NTT [28]
Input: Polynomial a(x) ∈ Zq [x] of degree n−1 and n-th primitive
root ωn ∈ Zq of unity
Output: Polynomial A(x) ∈ Zq [x] = NTT(a)
1: A← BitReverse(a) . permutation of coefficients
2: for m = 2 to n by m = 2m do
3: ωm ← ωn/mn
4: ω ← 1
5: for j = 0 to m/2− 1 do . butterfly loop
6: for k = 0 to n− 1 by m do
7: t← ω ·A[k + j +m/2]
8: u← A[k + j]
9: A[k + j]← u+ t
10: A[k + j +m/2]← u− t
11: end for
12: ω ← ω · ωm
13: end for
14: end for
in [27]. Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) based polyno-
mial multiplication has the lowest time complexity of
O(n log n). During a polynomial multiplication, Fourier
transform is applied on the input polynomials to bring
them to the Fourier domain. In the Fourier domain,
multiplication is a coefficient-wise operation. Finally, an
inverse Fourier transform is required to bring the result
back to polynomial representation. FFT and inverse-
FFT are fast methods that compute the transformations
in O(n log n). More information about FFT-based poly-
nomial multiplication can be found in [28]. However,
FFT and inverse-FFT perform arithmetic using real num-
bers and thus suffer from approximation errors, which
are not desired in cryptographic applications. Instead of
FFT, we use the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT)
which is a generalization of FFT and performs only
integer arithmetic. An iterative version of the NTT al-
gorithm is shown in Alg. 1. The coefficients of the input
polynomial are permuted first using the BitReverse()
function; then there are three nested loops. Inside the
inner-most loop, the ‘butterfly operation’, which consists
of a modular multiplication by constants ω followed by
modular addition and subtraction, is performed.
4.3 Lift q→Q
In this step a polynomial in Rq is lifted to the ring RQ
with the larger modulus Q. If RNS is not used, i.e., if tra-
ditional 180-bit big-integer representation is used, then
this lifting is free of cost as a coefficient which is in Zq
is also in ZQ. However, we use the RNS representation
and represent each coefficient using six 30-bit residues
(as described in Sec. 3.2) to leverage parallel processing.
The RNS basis of Q is an extension of the RNS basis of
q by seven more primes. Thus, to lift a coefficient from
the RNS of q to the RNS of Q, we need to compute
the additional residues. In the following we describe
two ways to compute Liftq→Q. We design hardware ar-
chitectures for both methods and compare performances.
Using traditional CRT Let a coefficient a in Zq is
represented in the RNS using the residues ai where the
RNS-base is composed of the primes qi.
The first step is to construct the simultaneous solution
modulo q from the RNS representation applying the CRT
(Theorem 1) as shown below.
a ≡
5∑
0
ai · q˜i · q∗i − v · q (1)
Here v is the rounded quotient after dividing the sum
of products
∑
ai · q˜i · q∗i by q. This computation involves
long-integer multiplications by q∗i , followed by long inte-
ger additions, and finally one long-integer division. After
this reconstruction, the extended RNS basis (in modulus
Q) is obtained by computing the additional residues a
mod qj for 6 ≤ j ≤ 12. Again, these reductions by qj
require costly multi-precision arithmetic.
Using approximate CRT This is a new algorithm
proposed by Halevi, Polyakov and Shoup in 2018 [29].
From now on we refer this optimized method as the ‘HPS
method’. The algorithm avoids long integer arithmetic
by introducing approximation in the calculation of the
quotient v. The algorithm computes the simultaneous
solution in a way different than in Eq. 1.
a ≡
∑(
ai · q˜i mod qi
) · q∗i − v′ · q (2)
Here v′ =
⌈
(
∑
(ai · q˜i mod qi) ·q∗i )/q
⌋
and after a sim-
plification [29] it becomes v′ =
⌈∑ ai·q˜i mod qi
qi
⌋
. Note
that, each of ai, qi and q˜i is a 30-bit integer. The approx-
imation is introduced during the division by qi. Using
IEEE 754 double floats data type, one can bound the
approximation error to 2−53 [29]. This negligible error
has in practice no impact on the correctness of HE.
4.4 Scale Q→q
In this step the coefficients of a polynomial in RQ are
scaled down and the result is a polynomial in Rq with
smaller modulus q. This scaling down operation takes a
coefficient, say a ∈ ZQ, and performs a division followed
by a rounding operation to get an intermediate scaled
coefficient d t·aq c where t is the plaintext modulus (e.g.,
2 for binary messages). Finally a modular reduction
by q is performed to get the corresponding coefficient
of the result polynomial in Rq. As we represent the
input coefficients using RNS, we need to compute the
simultaneous solution modulo Q to perform the division
operation. We have two approaches. The first approach
uses long integer arithmetic to compute these steps. The
second approach [29] shows an ingenious way to compute
the result without using long integer arithmetic in the
following two major steps.
1. First d t·aq c is computed in the RNS of p using arith-
metic of small numbers. This step computes d t·aq c
mod qj =
⌈∑5
0 ai · tQ˜ipqi
⌋
+ aj · tQ˜jq∗j mod qj for
6 ≤ j ≤ 12. Here Q˜k = (Q/qk)−1 mod qk for
k = i and k = j. In the actual computation, the
constants are also 30-bit integers as the computa-
tion is performed modulo 30-bit primes qj .
2. Finally, a basis switching from the RNS of p to the
RNS of q is performed using Liftq→Q.
We design two architectures for approaches for comput-
ing ScaleQ→q and compare performances.
5. ARCHITECTURE DETAILS
At the highest level of abstraction, our architecture
for computing on ciphertext is composed of two parts: a
software part running on the multi-core Arm processor,
and an instruction-set coprocessor on the FPGA. The
coprocessor accelerates custom homomorphic operations.
It is composed of three main components: polynomial
arithmetic unit, lifting-and-scaling unit and memory file.
5.1 Polynomial arithmetic unit
This unit is responsible for computing addition, sub-
traction and multiplication on the residue polynomi-
als. It has been designed to achieve maximum parallel
processing capability. The first level of parallelism is
achieved using dedicated ‘Residue Polynomial Arith-
metic Unit’ (RPAUs) leveraging the parallelism inher-
ently in the RNS representation. Another level of par-
allelism is obtained by instantiating multiple parallel
residue arithmetic cores within each RPAU.
5.1.1 Choice for number of RPAUs
The RNS of q and Q are composed of six and thirteen
primes respectively. If we keep one RPAU dedicated to
each prime, then we achieve the maximum parallelism.
But, computation is performed most of the time in the
RNS of q and as a consequence the seven RPAUs for the
last seven primes would remain idle most of the time.
We keep only d13/2e = 7 RPAUs in the architecture
where each one (except the last) is resource-shared by
two primes. E.g., the first RPAU is shared by q0 and
q6, the second by q1 and q7, and so on. The last RPAU
is used only by q12 as the total number of primes used
in our implementation is 13 which is an odd integer.
With this configuration, arithmetic in the RNS of q is
computed in a single batch using the first six RPAUs.
Arithmetic in the RNS of Q is computed in two batches:
the first batch is for the primes q0 to q5 and the last
batch is for the primes q6 to q12.
5.1.2 Choice for number of cores in RPAU
It is easy to observe that the NTT computation in
Alg. 1 is amiable to parallel processing. It appears that
using c number of cores we could reduce the computation
time roughly by a factor c. However, the algorithm level
parallelism is bottlenecked by memory access. Block
RAMs (BRAMs) are ideal for storing large arrays of
coefficients in FPGAs. In our target Zynq FPGA [24],
each BRAM36K slice can store an array of 1024 elements
where each element is of size 36 bits. A BRAM36K
comes with two ports for memory access and thus we
can read/write two coefficients per cycle. In our im-
plementation, a residue polynomial (4096 coefficients)
is stored using four BRAM36K slices. During NTT,
one port of a BRAM36K slice is used for reading and
the another port is used for writing. Since a residue
polynomial is distributed in four BRAM36K slices, the
maximum memory access rate is eight coefficients per
cycle. In Alg. 1, the butterfly operation consumes a pair
of coefficients and produces another pair of coefficients.
Hence, we set the number of butterfly cores to two to
achieve maximum efficiency in the read-compute-write
stream: four coefficients (two pairs) are read, then they
are processed using the two butterfly cores, and finally
the output four coefficients are written back every cycle.
5.1.3 Memory access scheme for parallel NTT
NTT has a complex memory access pattern due to
loop-dependent index gap between the two coefficients
that are processed in the butterfly steps (see Alg. 1).
When parallel butterfly cores are used, memory access
pattern becomes even more complex and this might lead
to memory access conflicts; e.g., two cores are trying
to read or write simultaneously in the same BRAM.
Furthermore, if the two coefficients A[k + j] and A[k +
j + m/2] in line 9 and 10 of Alg. 1 reside in the same
BRAM, then their reads must be performed sequentially
over the single read port. Hence, a special memory
access scheme is needed to tackle these two issues. In
[20] a single core memory-efficient NTT algorithm was
constructed that overcomes the second bottleneck by
keeping the two required coefficients (A[k+ j] and A[k+
j+m/2]) together in a same word of the memory. Thus,
a single read operation brings the paired coefficients to
the arithmetic unit. In our implementation we store the
paired coefficients in the same memory word [30] and
construct a dual core NTT algorithm that overcomes
the first bottleneck, i.e., access conflict.
As two coefficients are stored in the same word, the
virtual depth of the memory becomes 2048 and the
virtual word size becomes 60 bits. The memory unit is
composed of two blocks (vertical brown rectangles in
Fig. 3), each containing 1024 words of 60-bit size. The
lower block is accessed for the address range 0 to 1023
and the upper block is accessed for the address range
1024 to 2047. Within each brown block, two BRAM36Ks
are aligned, i.e., they have a common read address bus,
a common write address bus and a common write enable
signal. These brown blocks can be accessed in parallel.
The pattern of memory reads during the execution of
our dual core NTT algorithm is shown in Fig. 3. Write
operations during NTT have the same pattern, and
hence they are not shown in the figure. Read requests
by the first and the second butterfly cores are indicated
using R and R′ respectively with the sequence numbers.
The access pattern changes depending on the outer-most
loop variable m in Alg. 1.
From m = 2 (start of NTT) till m = 1024, the maxi-
mum index-gap between two consecutive read/write ad-
dresses is 512. Hence, the memory addresses requested
by the first and the second butterfly cores are exclusively
within the ranges [0, 1023] and [1024, 2047] respectively.
Naturally, the first core reads/writes the lower memory
block and the other core reads/writes the upper memory
block without causing any conflict.
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Figure 3: Memory access during two-core NTT.
For m = 2048, the index-gap is 1024. As a conse-
quence, each core now reads/writes both memory blocks.
We eliminate memory access conflicts by inverting the
order of address requests generated by the second core.
This is explained as follows. The first core reads ad-
dresses in the sequence 0 (lower memory block), 1024
(upper memory block), 1 (lower memory block), 1025
(upper memory block), and so on; whereas the other core
reads addresses in the sequence 1536 (upper memory
block), 512 (lower memory block), 1537 (upper mem-
ory block), 513 (lower memory block), and so on. The
first sequence accesses the lower memory first whereas
the second sequence accesses the other. This allocation
avoids memory access conflicts.
The last loop in the NTT (m = 4096) is executed
‘one memory word at a time’ following [30] and hence
the two cores exclusive read/write the lower and upper
memory blocks respectively.
5.1.4 Architecture of NTT core
Our NTT algorithm applies parallel processing on top
of the single thread memory-efficient NTT algorithm pre-
sented by Roy et al. [30], so our architecture for the NTT
computation has some similarities with their architec-
ture. One difference is that [30] designs the architecture
for computing public-key encryption where the polyno-
mials are typically 256 or 512 coefficients long. Since
our target is to speedup homomorphic multiplications,
where polynomials are much larger, instead of comput-
ing the constant twiddle factors, we store them using
on-chip memory to save cycles. This decision also elim-
inates bubble-cycles in the pipeline data-path of NTT
computation. Pipeline bubbles are caused due to the
data dependencies of the butterfly steps on the twiddle
factors. Previous work [20] reports that 20% cycles are
lost as bubble-cycles during NTT computation. Hence,
our choice of storing the twiddle factors is a logical for
speeding up the slow homomorphic multiplication.
In Fig. 4 we show the architecture diagram of a single
NTT arithmetic core. The integer multiplier is a 30x30
multiplier, implemented using DSP slices. The result
from the multiplier, which is a 60 bit integer, is reduced
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Figure 4: Architecture of NTT Core.
by a prime qi using the modular reduction block.
Among all the computation blocks in Fig.4, the mod-
ular reduction circuit is the costliest one. It can be
designed in several ways and selection of the right algo-
rithm is a key to the best performance. In our imple-
mentation, each NTT core should support arithmetic
modulo two primes as explained in Sec. 5.1.1. Hence,
we need a ‘generic’ modular reduction algorithm. ‘Bar-
rett reduction’ [31] is one such algorithm and is used
in [20]. However a Barrett reduction circuit is costly as
it requires computation of several multiplications.
In our implementation we use a sliding window method
that reduces the input integer step-by-step. With a
sliding window size of 6-bits, a table called ‘reduction
table’ containing 64 integers w ·230 mod qi for w = 0 to
w = 63 is used. At a time, the sliding window selects the
most significant 6 bits of operand integer and reduces
them with the help of the reduction table. This iterative
process continues until the intermediate result becomes a
31-bit integer. Obtaining the final reduced result might
require a subtraction of qi or 2qi from the intermediate
result. In our implementation, these sequential steps are
fully unrolled to achieve a bit-parallel modular reduction.
Pipeline registers are inserted in between several of these
steps to achieve a high clock frequency.
A pipeline strategy is also applied in the other arith-
metic circuits (multiplier, adder and subtractor). The
pipelined circuits are shown in green border in Fig. 4.
5.2 Architecture of Lift q→Q
In Sec. 4.3 we described two ways to compute the
Liftq→Q. We implement architectures for both ways.
5.2.1 Architecture for traditional Lift q→Q
The first architecture uses long integer arithmetic
and follows the design methodology presented in [20].
The flow of sequential and parallel computation steps
is shown using block diagrams in Fig. 5. Long integer
arithmetic is performed in the lower two blocks that
compute sop and division by q respectively. Though
shown in the flow diagram, the constant computations
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Figure 5: Architecture of Lift q→Q using multi-
precision arithmetic.
such as q˜i · q∗i are not performed in the actual implemen-
tation as these values are stored in tables to minimize
the time requirement. Following [20] the division by q is
performed by multiplying sop with the reciprocal of q.
We apply a block-level pipeline strategy to improve
throughput. In such an architecture, the maximum
throughput is determined by the slowest component in
the pipeline processing. The division block is the slowest
among all blocks and hence it determines the throughput.
Other blocks in the Fig. 5 have been designed to match
the throughput of the division block.
5.2.2 Architecture for new HPS [29] Lift q→Q
We propose the first hardware implementation of
Liftq→Q using the new HPS [29] method that does not
perform long integer arithmetic. The flow of its sequen-
tial and parallel steps are identified in Fig. 6. From the
flow diagram we see that the best processing time can
be obtained if all the blocks are computed in pipeline.
Hence, we implement a block-level pipeline architecture
and achieve high-level parallel processing.
The HPS optimization replaces costly long-integer
arithmetic by multiple small-integer operations. This
gives us the opportunity to introduce additional within-
block parallel processing. We design the individual blocks
to have a processing time of seven cycles at most, since
the output is a set of seven residues. ‘Block 2’ is the
most expensive since it computes seven summation-of-
products, where each summation involves six products.
Hence to speedup ‘Block 2’, we keep seven parallel
Multiply-and-Accumulate (MAC) circuits in it.
The other blocks have less computation load and hence
they process the input operands sequentially. For e.g.,
‘Block 1’ multiplies the input ais by qis one by one taking
six cycles; the last block computing the result residues
one by one in total seven cycles.
In ‘Block 3’ the divisions by qis are performed. The
original HPS paper [29] uses floating point divisions for
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Figure 6: Architecture of Lift q→Q using small
number arithmetic.
this purpose. We do not use any costly floating point
unit and compute the divisions as multiplications by the
reciprocals 1/qi. This leads to simplified architecture and
faster processing. The constant reciprocals are stored in
the ROM memory with a precision of 89-bits after the
decimal point. Actually the first 29 bits after the decimal
point in each reciprocal 1/qi are all-zeros. Hence, the
multiplications are actually computed between 30-bit
a′is and 60 non-zero bits of 1/qis. The probability of
getting an approximation error in this way is less than
2−80, whereas it is 2−53 in the original HPS paper [29].
Integer
Multiplier
Integer
Adder qj
Modular
Reduction by
accconstants
coefficients
Figure 7: Generic architecture for multiplication
based building blocks used in Fig. 6.
Fig. 7 shows a generic architecture for the building
blocks used in Fig. 6 to multiply with or without accumu-
lation. Two optional data-paths with or without accumu-
lation are shown in blue and red color respectively. The
constants are kept in on-chip memory. We also apply
low-level pipeline strategy to improve the clock frequency
of the basic arithmetic circuits namely, integer multi-
plier, modular reduction, modular adder/subtractor etc.
In this way, two levels of pipeline strategies (i.e., block
and low-level) are applied to achieve the best perfor-
mance. Buffer registers are placed in between blocks
when needed for synchronizing the flow of computation.
5.3 Architecture of Scale Q→q
We describe two architectures to implement the
ScaleQ→q operation. The first architecture uses multi-
precision arithmetic and follows the design methodology
of [20]. The flow of sequential and parallel computation
steps is shown in Fig. 8. ‘Block 3’ is the costliest, com-
puting division by q. Here t is the plaintext modulus
(e.g., 2 for binary messages). Again, the division is per-
formed by multiplying the dividend by the reciprocal of
q. Since, a is 390 bit large, the precision of the reciprocal
should be larger than 571. Note that division by q is also
performed in Fig. 5 during the Liftq→Q operation. Since
Liftq→Q and ScaleQ→q are not computed simultaneously,
the division architecture is resource-shared by the both
operations. The cycle count of the division operation
during ScaleQ→q is almost four times larger than the
division operation during Liftq→Q as the precision of the
reciprocal and the width of the dividend both are two
times larger. The other blocks have been designed to
have similar cycle count as Block 3. We apply block-level
pipeline strategy to increase the throughput.
Now we propose the first hardware implementation of
ScaleQ→q using the HPS [29] method. The flow of its
sequential and parallel steps are identified in Fig. 9. Sim-
ilar to the previous optimized Liftq→Q architecture, we
apply block-level pipeline strategy to achieve high-level
parallelism. ‘Block 1’ and ‘Block 2’ compute summa-
tion of products using MAC circuits (without modular
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reduction in Fig. 7). The constants Ii and Ri in these
two blocks stand for the integer and real parts of the
constants tQ˜ipqi respectively. The reals Ri are stored with
60-bit precision after the decimal point. ‘Block 3’ uses
the circuit of Fig. 7 with the red data-path. The final
block in the flow diagram receives seven residues in the
RNS of p. It then reuses the Liftq→Q architecture of
Fig. 6 to compute the residues in the RNS representa-
tion of q. As the block-level pipelined architecture of
Fig. 6 computes in seven cycles, the remaining blocks of
the ScaleQ→q architecture in Fig. 9 have been designed
to compute in seven cycles.
Since several of the building blocks in the Liftq→Q and
ScaleQ→q architectures use ‘multiplication and accumu-
lation’ type operations, one design option is to realize
a resource-shared architecture so that the similar or
somewhat similar operations can be executed. This ap-
proach would reduce the area requirement and increase
the computation time significantly. In our architecture
we keep the building blocks separate to apply block-level
pipeline processing.
Block diagram of the instruction-set coprocessor show-
ing the connections of the seven RPAUs, two parallel
cores for Liftq→Q and ScaleQ→q and the memory file
Figure 10: Block diagram of coprocessor for com-
puting homomorphic operations
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Figure 11: The high-level architecture and inter-
facing of hardware and software
(shown using rectangles M) is shown in Fig. 10.
5.4 Hardware Software Interface
The high-level architecture of our HW/SW codesign
is shown in Fig. 11. We enable parallel processing with
two coprocessor instances in the FPGA, and reserve
one Arm core for each. We also used a third Arm core
for managing the network connection to clients, and
distributing the work load among the application cores.
Our software runs ‘baremetal’ i.e. without any oper-
ating system, and uses light-weight IP stack for client-
server communication. For the data transfer between
the DDR memory and hardware, it uses Direct Memory
Access (DMA) placed between the memory and inter-
facing units shown in Fig. 11. The hardware could also
access the DDR memory for intermediate computation
results, but that would add a significant data transfer
overhead. Hence, BRAM-based on-chip memory is used.
In the software side, we apply efficient memory man-
agement. The coefficients of a ciphertext are kept in
contiguous memory locations. Using this strategy, we
could transfer large data very fast in a continuous DMA.
In Sec. 6 we will show that the use of this strategy indeed
reduces the data transfer overhead significantly.
Working with parallel executing cores increases the
performance significantly in both software and hardware,
but also requires a complex design as it requires access
synchronization. The ‘Networking Arm Core’ in Fig. 11
is chosen to manage the DDR memory allocation. DMA
access conflicts, i.e., two simultaneous DMA requests,
are avoided using Xilinx’ mutual exclusion HW IP Core.
6. RESULTS
We implemented our domain specific programmable
accelerator for homomorphic computations on ciphertext
on a single Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU102
Evaluation Kit [24]. We coded the software in C and com-
piled it with GCC (available through the Xilinx SDK).
Our custom hardware modules were described with Ver-
ilog. During design-space exploration, we implemented
two hardware architectures. One of them uses traditional
CRT-based Liftq→Q and ScaleQ→q operations, perform-
ing multi-precision integer arithmetic. The other applies
Table 1: Performance of high-level operations
using one coprocessor.
Operation Speed
(cycles) (msec)
Mult in HW 5,349,567 4.458
Add in HW 31,339 0.026
Add in SW 54,680,467 45.567
Send two ciphertexts to HW 434,013 0.362
Receive result ciphertext from HW 215,697 0.180
the HPS optimization techniques [29] and achieves the
best performance. From now on, if not exclusively men-
tioned, performance and area reports are presented only
for the faster architecture. Results for the slower are
presented briefly in a subsection.
6.1 Timing results
The hardware-based coprocessor runs at 200 MHz
and the Arm processors run at 1.2 GHz. The DMA
module is clocked at 250 MHz, aiming to minimize the
data transfer overhead. Cycle counts for various opera-
tions are measured from the software side reading the
Arm processors’ cycle-count register. As our coprocessor
implements an instruction-set architecture, we report
timing requirements for high-level operations and the
low-level instructions used for them. In Table 1 perfor-
mances of the high-level operations are presented. The
timings for Add and Mult in HW exclude the overhead
of transferring the operand and result ciphertexts. Com-
puting the simple Add operation in SW using a single
Arm core requires 80 times more time than the same
computation in HW, including the overhead of sending
and receiving ciphertexts. The computation time for
Mult includes the overhead of intermediate data trans-
fers (roughly 30%) during the relinearization steps. If
larger FPGAs are used, this overhead could be reduced
or eliminated by storing the relinearization keys in the
HW at the cost of additional ROM memory.
In our FPGA we place two coprocessors in parallel
and achieve 2x throughput. E.g, two Mult operations
take roughly the same time as one Mult operation. We
can compute 400 Mult operations per second.
The performance of each instruction of our instruction-
set architecture is shown in Table 2. The table also shows
how many times each instruction is called for computing
one Mult operation. The Add operation requires exe-
cuting the Coefficient-wise-Addition instruction twice
as a ciphertext in the FV scheme is composed of two
polynomials in Rq. The Liftq→Q instruction lifts a poly-
nomial from Rq to RQ in less than 0.1ms, using two
parallel cores. The ScaleQ→q instruction first scales the
input polynomial and computes the intermediate re-
sult in the RNS of p. Then it uses the data-path of
Liftq→Q to map this result to the RNS representation
of q. Hence, ScaleQ→q performs more computation than
Liftq→Q. But, benefiting the block-level pipeline strategy
in the sequential execution of the two steps, the overall
computation time for ScaleQ→q remains almost equal to
the computation time of Liftq→Q.
Table 2: Performance of individual instructions.
Instruction # of Speed per Call
Calls (cycles) (µ sec)
NTT 14 87,582 73.0
Inverse-NTT 8 102,043 85.0
Coeff. wise Multiplication 20 15,662 13.1
Coeff. wise Addition 26 16,292 13.6
Memory Rearrange 22 25,006 20.8
Liftq→Q (2 cores) 4 99,137 82.6
ScaleQ→q (2 cores) 3 99,274 82.7
Table 3: Comparison of data transfer techniques.
Data Transfer Type Speed
(cycles) (µ sec)
Single Transfer of 98,304-bytes 90708 76
Transfers with 16,384-byte chunks 130686 109
Transfers with 1,024-byte chunks 242771 202
We put significant effort in minimizing the overhead
of data transfer. The first decision we took was to keep
enough internal memory to avoid frequent access to the
external DDR memory during the execution of Mult.
Only during the relinearization steps, data transfer is
needed to load the large relinearization keys. The second
decision is using the optimum data transfer size, as
mentioned in Sec. 5.4. In Table 3 costs for three types
of data transfers are shown. In our implementation, we
use single transfer to achieve the minimum overhead.
6.2 Resource Requirements
Table 4 shows the resource utilization in the target
FPGA. It shows that the design is constrained on mem-
ory size. Besides the two coprocessors, the DMA and
Interfacing Unit contributes to utilization. On the soft-
ware side, three Arm cores of the target Zynq are used.
6.3 Performance without HPS optimization
The other coprocessor architecture uses slower Liftq→Q
and ScaleQ→q architectures. At 225 MHz clock, using
only one core we can compute the Liftq→Q and ScaleQ→q
operations in 1.68 and 4.3 msec respectively. To speedup
computation, we keep four parallel cores for computing
Liftq→Q and ScaleQ→q. The polynomial arithmetic unit
in the faster and slower architectures are similar. At
225 MHz clock frequency, this coprocessor architecture
requires 8.3 msec (including all data transfer overhead)
to compute one Mult operation. Though the Liftq→Q
Table 4: Resource Utilization
(for Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 Evaluation Kit)
LUTs Registers BRAMs DSPs
(# of used instances)
(% utilization)
Overall
133692 60312 815 416
49% 11% 89% 16%
Single 63522 25622 388 208
Coprocessor 23% 5% 43% 8%
Table 5: Estimated results for different parame-
ter sets considering a single processor.
Parameter Resources Mult time
(n, log q) LUT/Reg./BRAM/DSP Comp./Comm./Total
212, 180 64K/25K/0.4K/0.2K 4.46/0.54/5.0 msec
213, 360 128K/50K/1.6K/0.4K 9.68/2.16/11.9 msec
214, 720 256K/100K/6.4K/0.8K 21.0/8.64/29.6 msec
215, 1, 440 512K/200K/25.6K/1.6K 45.6/34.6/80.2 msec
and ScaleQ→q are much slower, the time for Mult is less
than 2x slower in comparison to the faster coprocessor
architecture. This difference is due to a difference in
the relinearization operation. In the faster architecture,
each relinearization key is a vector of six polynomials.
Traditional CRT-based ScaleQ→q offers the flexibility to
choosing the number of polynomials in the relineariza-
tion key. The slower coprocessor uses three times smaller
relinearization key in comparison to the faster architec-
ture. If both use relinearization keys of length six, then
the slower processor would become another 30% slower.
We measures the power consumption of our design
using the Power Advantage Tool. The static power
consumption is 5.3 W. The continuous execution of a ho-
momorphic multiplication operation including the input
and output data transfers requires 2.2W dynamic power
consumption on a single core execution. In the concur-
rent double core execution of the same, the dynamic
power consumption reaches 3.4W.
6.4 Estimates for other parameter sets
For estimating performance for larger parameter sets,
we assume that the sizes of target FPGAs also scale
appropriately. We assume that for every doubling of
both the polynomial degree and coefficient size (≈ 4.34×
increase in overall computation) in the parameter set,
we double the number of RPAUs and Lift/Scale cores
(≈ 2× increase in logic-area). Consequently, the net
computation increases by ≈ 2.17×. The overhead of
off-chip data transfer increases by ≈ 4×. In Table 5 we
apply this estimation model iteratively to estimate area,
memory and performances for various parameter sets.
6.5 Comparisons with Related Works
In the literature there are several reported implemen-
tations of somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE)
schemes. A totally fair comparison between the imple-
mentations is not always possible, firstly because there
are several SHE schemes, secondly because there are
differences in the choice of parameters, and finally be-
cause the implementation platforms vary. The most fair
comparison is with the NFLlib [22] based software imple-
mentation of the FV scheme presented in [4]. The imple-
mentation uses a similar parameter set. The highly op-
timized single threaded software implementation spends
33 milliseconds and 0.1 milliseconds for computing one
Mult and Add respectively on an Intel Core i5-3427 pro-
cessor running at 1.8 GHz. Using two coprocessors in
the FPGA, we achieve more than 13x throughput with
respect to the NFLlib-based software implementation.
Latest generation Intel i5 reaches up to 40W on heavy
load operations [32]. In comparison, our processor has a
peak power consumption of 8.7 W.
A very recent implementation [33] by Badawi et al.
presents performances of the FV scheme for various
parameter sets on CPUs and GPUs. They also use
HPS optimization for faster Liftq→Q and ScaleQ→q oper-
ations. Their single-threaded software implementation
for a parameter set n = 4096 and 60-bit q requires
around 10 msec to compute one homomorphic multi-
plication for 30-bit moduli size (which we also use) on
Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum running at 2.1 GHz. Using
26 threads in multi-threaded experiments, they could
reduce the time to 4 msec only. Their highly optimized
GPU implementations on Tesla K80 (2496 cores, 0.82
GHz, 12 GB RAM) and Tesla V100 (5120 cores, 1.38
GHz, 16 GB RAM) require 1.98 and 0.86 msec respec-
tively at the cost of humongous power consumption. We
estimate that for 180-bit q, computation times of their
implementations would increase at least three times. In
a fair comparison (i.e., n = 4096 and 180-bit q), their
fastest implementation on Tesla V100 performing 388
homomorphic multiplications per second is slower than
our implementation achieving 400 multiplications.
Po¨ppelmann et al. [14] implemented of the YASHE [8]
scheme in the Catapult [34] architecture which is an
FPGA-based domain specific accelerator for cloud com-
puting applications. Their implementation for the pa-
rameter set with polynomial size of 4,096 (same as ours)
and ciphertext coefficient size 128 bits (smaller than ours)
run at 100 MHz clock frequency and require 6.75 msec.
The YASHE scheme is computationally three to four
times faster than the FV scheme and has roughly half
memory requirement. Even with a faster SHE scheme
and a smaller parameter set, their implementation is
slower than ours. Achieving two times higher clock fre-
quency (200 MHz) as well as computation using parallel
coprocessor cores are major advancements towards mak-
ing homomorphic encryption practical. The YASHE
scheme is not considered secure anymore and hence is
not used due to an attack by Albrecht et al. [35] in 2016.
Next we compare our results with the hardware im-
plementation by Roy et al. [20]. They implement the
FV scheme for a much larger parameter set (polynomial
size 32,768 and ciphertext coefficient size 1,228 bits).
Due to such a large parameter set, only one residue
polynomial arithmetic unit could fit in their target plat-
form that has a medium size Xilinx Virtex 6 FPGA.
Their architecture suffers from a massive data transfer
overhead as they need to continuously read and write
DDR memory. We designed our programmable archi-
tecture for supporting less complex cloud computing
applications (thus smaller parameter set). We use suf-
ficient on-chip memory (implemented using BRAMs)
to store the two operand ciphertexts and in this way
we minimize data transfer overhead. We estimate that
a hypothetical architecture following our design steps
(explained in Sec. 6.4) would be able to compute ho-
momorphic multiplication in less than 0.1 sec (Table 5)
when implemented on a sufficiently large FPGA. This
significant difference is mostly due to the fact that our
design methodology avoids costly long integer arithmetic
and frequent off-chip data transfer and at the same time
applies more parallel processing.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a programmable and high-
performance domain specific architecture for computing
homomorphic operations on ciphertext. We applied
the recent arithmetic optimization techniques proposed
by Halevi, Polyakov and Shoup to avoid costly multi-
precision arithmetic, and designed a parallel polynomial
multiplication algorithm with an efficient memory access
scheme to speedup the homomorphic multiplication op-
eration. In the hardware architecture, we used parallel
computation cores to minimize cycle count, and applied
circuit-level and block-level pipeline strategy to benefit
parallel processing and reach a clock frequency of 200
MHz. Further, we utilized the on-chip memory opti-
mally to avoid frequent off-chip data transfers. Using
highly optimized building blocks, we constructed our
multi-core multi-processor architecture. Finally we im-
plemented our optimized domain specific programmable
architecture on a single Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MP-
SoC ZCU102 Evaluation Kit and demonstrated that it
can achieve a throughput of 400 homomorphic multipli-
cations per second, which is 13x faster than a heavily
optimized software implementation on an Intel i5 proces-
sor. Our results make homomorphic encryption practical
in several cloud computing applications.
Discussions. FPGAs are becoming more and more
popular in cloud computing applications. The Amazon
offers FPGA-accelerated cloud for accelerating perfor-
mance critical applications [36]. An Amazon EC2 F1
instance offers either one or eight Xilinx Virtex Ultra-
Scale+ FPGAs attached to a server-grade Intel Xeon
processor. These FPGAs have five times more resources
than our Zynq platform. Our instruction-set coproces-
sor architecture has a very modular structure. Most of
the building blocks, excluding the IP Cores, have been
described using behavioral Verilog. Hence, the source
codes of our accelerator can be easily ported to these
powerful FPGAs. We estimate that each Amazon F1
instance could run at least ten coprocessors in parallel.
Our coprocessor architecture offers trade-offs between
hardware cost and performance. Therefore, we would
like to remark that the utilization and performance re-
sults reported in this paper are not the definite numbers,
but only belongs to the configuration used in this paper.
The design decisions can be tweaked to meet different
requirements. For e.g., by using more computation cores
we could achieve a lower latency or by reducing the
number of memories we could lower the hardware cost.
8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported in part by the Research
Council KU Leuven: C16/15/058. In addition, this work
was supported by the European Commission through
the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
under grant agreement Cathedral ERC Advanced Grant
695305, by H2020-ICT-2014-644209 HEAT, by EU
H2020 project FENTEC (Grant No. 780108) and by
the Hercules Foundation AKUL/11/19.
9. REFERENCES
[1] IBM, “Top 7 most common uses of cloud computing,” 2014.
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/cloud-computing/2014/02/
06/top-7-most-common-uses-of-cloud-computing.
[2] J. W. Bos, K. Lauter, and M. Naehrig, “Private predictive
analysis on encrypted medical data,” Journal of Biomedical
Informatics, 2014.
[3] N. Peng, G. Luo, K. Qin, and A. Chen, “Query-biased
preview over outsourced and encrypted data,” Scientific
World Journal, 2013.
[4] J. W. Bos, W. Castryck, I. Iliashenko, and F. Vercauteren,
“Privacy-friendly forecasting for the smart grid using
homomorphic encryption and the group method of data
handling,” in Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT
2017, 2017.
[5] T. Graepel, K. Lauter, and M. Naehrig, “Ml confidential:
Machine learning on encrypted data,” in Information
Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2012, 2012.
[6] R. L. Rivest, L. Adleman, and M. L. Dertouzos, “On data
banks and privacy homomorphisms,” Foundations of secure
computation, 1978.
[7] C. Gentry, “Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal
lattices,” in Proceedings of the 41st ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing (STOC 2009), pp. 169–178, 2009.
[8] J. W. Bos, K. Lauter, J. Loftus, and M. Naehrig, “Improved
security for a ring-based fully homomorphic encryption
scheme,” in Proceedings of the 14th IMA International
Conference on Cryptography and Coding (IMACC 2013),
2013.
[9] J. Fan and F. Vercauteren, “Somewhat practical fully
homomorphic encryption.” Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2012/144, 2012. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[10] A. Badawi, B. Veeravalli, C. Mun, and K. Aung,
“High-performance FV somewhat homomorphic encryption
on GPUs: An implementation using CUDA,” IACR
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
Systems, 2018.
[11] W. Wang and X. Huang, “FPGA implementation of a
large-number multiplier for fully homomorphic encryption,”
in IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems
(ISCAS 2013), 2013.
[12] Y. Doro¨z, E. O¨ztu¨rk, and B. Sunar, “Evaluating the
hardware performance of a million-bit multiplier,” in
Proceedings of the 16th Euromicro Conference on Digital
System Design (DSD 2013), 2013.
[13] W. Wang and X. Huang, “VLSI design of a large-number
multiplier for fully homomorphic encryption,” IEEE
Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI)
Systems, 2014.
[14] T. Po¨ppelmann, M. Naehrig, A. Putnam, and A. Macias,
“Accelerating homomorphic evaluation on reconfigurable
hardware,” in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
Systems - CHES, 2015.
[15] X. Cao, C. Moore, M. O’Neill, E. O’Sullivan, and N. Hanley,
“Optimised multiplication architectures for accelerating fully
homomorphic encryption,” IEEE Transactions on
Computers, 2016.
[16] D. Cousins, K. Rohloff, and D. Sumorok, “Designing an
FPGA-accelerated homomorphic encryption co-processor,”
IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, to
appear.
[17] E. O¨ztu¨rk, Y. Doro¨z, E. Savas¸, and B. Sunar, “A custom
accelerator for homomorphic encryption applications,” IEEE
Transactions on Computers, 2017.
[18] Y. Doro¨z, E. O¨ztu¨rk, E. Savas, and B. Sunar, “Accelerating
LTV based homomorphic encryption in reconfigurable
hardware,” in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
Systems - CHES, 2015.
[19] S. S. Roy, K. Ja¨rvinen, F. Vercauteren, V. Dimitrov, and
I. Verbauwhede, “Modular hardware architecture for
somewhat homomorphic function evaluation,” in
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES,
2015.
[20] S. S. Roy, K. Ja¨rvinen, J. Vliegen, F. Vercauteren, and
I. Verbauwhede, “HEPCloud: An FPGA-based multicore
processor for FV somewhat homomorphic function
evaluation,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, 2018.
[21] V. Migliore, M. M. Real, V. Lapotre, A. Tisserand,
C. Fontaine, and G. Gogniat, “Hardware/software co-design
of an accelerator for FV homomorphic encryption scheme
using Karatsuba algorithm,” IEEE Transactions on
Computers, 2018.
[22] CryptoExperts, “FV-NFLlib,” 2016.
https://github.com/CryptoExperts/FV-NFLlib.
[23] M. Research, “Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library
(SEAL),” 2016. https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/download/details.aspx?id=56202.
[24] Xilinx, ZCU102 Evaluation Board User Guide, 2017. v1.3.
[25] C. Dobraunig, M. Eichlseder, L. Grassi, V. Lallemand,
G. Leander, E. List, F. Mendel, and C. Rechberger, “Rasta:
A cipher with low ANDdepth and few ANDs per bit,” 2018.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/181.
[26] M. R. Albrecht, “Complexity estimates for solving LWE.”
https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-
estimator/raw/HEAD/estimator.py.
[27] D. Bernstein, “Fast multiplication and its applications,”
Algorithmic Number Theory, 2008.
[28] T. H. Cormen, C. Stein, R. L. Rivest, and C. E. Leiserson,
Introduction to Algorithms. McGraw-Hill Higher Education,
2001.
[29] S. Halevi, Y. Polyakov, and V. Shoup, “An improved RNS
variant of the BFV homomorphic encryption scheme,” 2018.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/117.
[30] S. Sinha Roy, F. Vercauteren, N. Mentens, D. D. Chen, and
I. Verbauwhede, “Compact ring-LWE cryptoprocessor,” in
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems aˆA˘S¸ CHES
2014, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014.
[31] P. Barrett, “Implementing the Rivest Shamir and Adleman
public key encryption algorithm on a standard digital signal
processor,” in Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 86:
Proceedings, 1987.
[32] “Intel Kaby Lake Core i7-7700K, i7-7700, i5-7600K, i5-7600
Review.” URL:
www.tomshardware.com/reviews/intel-kaby-lake-core-
i7-7700k-i7-7700-i5-7600k-i5-7600,4870-10.html, last
checked on 2018-08-15, 2017.
[33] A. A. Badawi, Y. Polyakov, K. M. M. Aung, B. Veeravalli,
and K. Rohloff, “Implementation and performance evaluation
of RNS variants of the BFV homomorphic encryption
scheme,” 2018. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/589.
[34] A. P. et al., “A reconfigurable fabric for accelerating
large-scale datacenter services,” in 2014 ACM/IEEE 41st
International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA),
2014.
[35] L. D. Martin Albrecht, Shi Bai, “A subfield lattice attack on
overstretched NTRU assumptions: Cryptanalysis of some
FHE and Graded Encoding Schemes,” 2016.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/127.
[36] A. W. Instances, “Amazon EC2 F1 Instances.” URL:
https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/f1/, last
checked on 2018-08-03.
